The article is an attempt to answer the question about the state of Poland's security after the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century, what are its determinants, what kind of challenges Poland faces and which of them may turn into a threat and which into an opportunity, or what Polish potential is and which of its components determine its position on the international arena. It is achieved through a detailed analysis of actions undertaken by Poland in the international arena to strengthen its international position as well as the level of its security. Thus, the aim is to identify those determinants which may contribute to establishing a stronger position and which can create problems and become a formidable challenge in the context of various aspects of security, and even develop into a threat. Unfortunately, the picture which comes out of the above mentioned analysis is not optimistic and the impression is that Poland did not use the chance it was given after the accession to the NATO and the EU.
INTRODUCTION
Looking at the European Union, one may perceive more and more undemocratic ways of implementation of the European integration. The European Union is now closer to the creation of new divisions due to deepening differences between the Member States, as well as the formation of the "mainstream" (built around Germany and France) and "inferior side countries" than to the progressive integration. Poland is known to be a part of the second of the above mentioned groups, and yet at the same time, it formulates extremely euro-enthusiastic statements at the political level, setting itself away from NATO and the United States -the only Polish real guarantors of security. In the light of the above, it is worth asking the question: Polonia, quo vadis?
Hence, the article is an attempt to answer the question about the state of Poland's security after the fi rst decade of the twentyfi rst century, what are its determinants, what kind of challenges Poland faces and which of them may turn into a threat and which into an opportunity, or what Polish potential is and which of its components determine its position on the international arena. It will be achieved through a detailed analysis of actions undertaken by Poland in the international arena to strengthen its international position as well as the level of its security. Thus, the aim was to identify those determinants which may contribute to establishing a stronger position and which can create problems and become a challenge in the context of various aspects of security, or even develop into a threat. Unfortunately, the picture which comes out of the above mentioned analysis is not optimistic and the impression is that Poland did not use the chance it was given after the accession to the NATO and the EU.
POSITION OF POLAND IN THE REGION
The power and importance in the region plays a signifi cant role in building the image and international position of the state. It is a good starting point to conduct pro-active policies, makes it possible to act on behalf of, or in defence of smaller states' interests. This of course causes a further increase of importance and opens other political opportunities for the leader state as well as contributes to the advancement of its own geostrategic interests and objectives.
At the regional level, the most important geopolitical result of the Spring of Nations of 1989 was the emergence of the Central Europe, which was both an objective process and the result of a conscious effort of the countries in the region. It was about the opportunity to pursue common interests in the international arena (mainly integration into the Western structures, but also establishing a common policy towards the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation). Poland played an important role of the initiator and leader in this process, being its benefi ciary at the same time.
The transition period, when the Soviet satellite countries tried to regain their sovereignty, gave Poland ample opportunities to undertake actions, which were marked by various elements of the leadership in the region. The changes, which were launched in Poland by the "Solidarity" movement, evoked the so called domino effect. At that time, Poland managed to take the place of a leader, as other countries were inspired by the events that took place in Poland in 1989. Shortly after 1989, Poland began to engage actively in regional cooperation (the Visegrad Group, the Central European Initiative, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States).
After Poland's accession to NATO, regional policy has not yet lost its importance. Poland felt more responsible for the situation in the region and sought to maintain its position as a strong leader.
It was also manifested by supporting the efforts of Slovakia to integrate with the North Atlantic Alliance. Poland wanted to show that its accession was fully justifi ed, and that the country was ready to take responsibility for the entire region. However, generally, reaching the two strategic objectives, which were accession to NATO and the European Union, countries of the region have lost interest in each other, because not much could be achieved through mutual support. It turned out that the next steps to pursue national interests need to follow a different path, and goals of these countries' foreign policies were not coinciding. Poland lost its leadership in the region, as it did not have much to offer to smaller countries when they also were a part of the abovementioned structures.
In 2002, professor Roman Kuźniar (2002, p. 57) predicted that the role played by regional cooperation (useful from the point of view of Poland) would lose its signifi cance because of loosening the bonds of solidarity between the countries. "International identity of Central Europe, after a short awakening in the last decade of the twentieth century, will go back into history; in this way, it will disappear one of the most important external conditions of Polish foreign policy". And, in fact, it happened so after the fi nal integration with the Western structures, namely with the European Union. The development of a common Central European identity or a common occurrence in the international arena ceased to exist (discounting regional cross-border initiatives). At the level of "high politics" such cooperation does not function (it is exclusively declarative).
It seems that after the accession to the EU, Poland fell into apathy forgetting how important are local small alliances and coalitions (including the military sphere). Such alliances have nothing to do with breaking of the EU's or NATO's cohesion (similar suggestions can be found e.g. in the analysis conducted by W. Lorenz (2013) ), but are intended to strengthen the position of the country in the region, and thus are designed to be a tool for the security situation improvement. It was J. Piłsudski who noticed that Poland's power lies within alliances and regional cooperation as well as in leading these alliances and presenting skills to encourage joint actions. Such approach weakens the neoimperial attempts of Russia and prevents the policy of divide et impera. Central European region integration concepts are not new, they were formulated, among others, by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who claimed that individualistic approach is less effective with respect to such undertakings as negotiations with NATO or the EU.
Nowadays, regional cooperation in Central European region is best realized within the Visegrad Group (V4), even though this cooperation could be and should be much more advanced and effective. Poland ought to become an advocate of the idea of the Eastern Partnership (EP) among the V4 countries and emphasize how important it is to promote the principles of democracy in the EP countries as well as to help them take over Western instead of Russian political and social patterns. Particularly important is the cooperation with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but also Belarus cannot be forgotten. Nowadays, it seems that the West has already given up this country and let it remain in the Russian sphere of infl uence, which is a failure of the European Union's Eastern policy. For the Visegrad Group Eastern Partnership can become an important test for the strategic dimension of the Visegrad Group as well as for the region's importance and strength within the EU (Szczerski, 2009, p. 52,54) .
Regardless of the fact that the current perception of some threats to security among the V4 countries may be different (it is primarily concerned with the approach to Russia), it is possible to develop cooperation and joint initiatives. A good example of such collaboration is the creation of the 3 NATO Signal Battalion in Bydgoszcz, and it may also prove to be the NATO Military Police Centre of Excellence, which is also to be located in Bydgoszcz. Another opportunity for joint action will be delivered by the Visegrad Battle Group under the Polish leadership, which is going to operate in the fi rst half of 2016 1 . Such initiatives are desired to show the ability of the region to work together on greater fora and strengthen their position. They are undertaken with a relatively low cost, but can contribute to the development of further initiatives in the military sphere, i.e. joint exercises, trainings, technology development, the idea of pooling and sharing within the EU or smart defence within NATO.
Unfortunately, the V4 is treated in the EU as an "informal discussion club", with the Member States only occasionally formulating a common statement (Gostyńska, Parker 2012, p.11) . Such perception of the Visegrad Group denies its ability of having an effective infl uence on the European policy. The depreciation of its importance does not help its Member States in strengthening their international position. Nevertheless, nothing happens without a reason. The V4 did not come out with any coherent idea and did not try to present anything on the EU forum. The Eastern Partnership, although supported by the rest of the V4 countries, was a Polish and Swedish concept, and not of the Visegrad Group.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that it is necessary to develop a long-term strategy towards current issues and loyal cooperation within the V4, as only such approach will allow these countries to succeed. For Poland, it is the only way to rebuild the former role it played in the region. This path leads through the Visegrad Group as well as closer cooperation with the Baltic States. Despite reactivation of the Group after the accession of its members to the EU, its activity is not spectacular and certainly far less effective than its potential. The role of Poland would be to build an interesting offer and try to integrate the V4 countries and persuade them to cooperate in a broader formula with Romania and the Baltic states in order to promote common interests of the region. It would be also important to strengthen cooperation in the so-called V4-AGAT 2 (M adej, 2010, p. 10-12)formula, which gives an opportunity to play a signifi cant role of integrator and connector (bridge) of this area with the West. Summing up, it is worth mentioning an interesting paradox. Western countries perceive Poland (which is also in line with Poland's self-perception) as the leader of the region, while the very countries of the region do not.
POLAND AND THE EU
The magnitude of the changes that have taken place in Poland over the past few years can be analyzed through the prism of different categories and interests, and conclude with diverse opinions. The main question that arises after nearly a decade after Poland's accession to the European Union is whether the membership in this powerful (?) organization has contributed to the growth of Poland's security, and above all to strengthening of its position in the international arena (with respect to the realization of national interests and achieving its strategic objectives). The answer to this question is neither easy nor straightforward. Hence, this part focuses on the challenges to the Polish security with respect to the membership in the European Union, as well as outlines the roles that Poland plays in the international arena and its position in the European Union. It also attempts to show the trend of changes that can be observed in these areas over the past few years. Therefore, it concentrates on the Polish raison d'etat as well as transformation that took place with respect to the accession to the EU. It also aims at presenting the main trends in the Polish security policy after accession to the European Union, and concludes with the evaluation of the Polish role in the EU.
Since the realization of the strategic objectives formulated after 1989 (i.e. the accession to the NATO and the European Union), none of the Polish governments has formulated new priorities and strategic objectives or has set directions for further development of the country in terms of the membership in the European Union. Internal political struggles do not empower Poland's position in the international arena or have a positive infl uence on its image.
It is worth then to recall the main rationales for Poland's entry into the EU. They can be divided into several groups:
• general: the creation of democratic institutions and free market mechanisms (such as ownership of the means of production, protection of property rights, rising role of the parliament, local government and public opinion); • political: integration as a political means of reducing tensions, confl icts and maintaining security; • social: raising the living standards and introduction of the EU norms; • economic and fi nancial ( Nowak 2006, p. 74-77) In each of these areas, Poland could theoretically benefi t using skillfully the available tools. It would be necessary to defi ne Polish short-and long-term interests in each of these spheres. Looking from a ten-year perspective, it seems that the most obvious benefi ts after Poland's accession to the EU are as follows:
• improvement of long-term economic development conditions; • enhanced collaboration with economically more developed countries and intensifi cation of economic relations with the EU; • improvement of life chances of the society; • progressive breaking down of civilizational and cultural barriers; • strengthening of the image of Poland among foreign investors and increase in the number of direct investments; • improvement of the fi nancial situation and investment capacity in the agricultural sector; • increase in exports;
• increase in the profi tability of food production (mainly meat and milk); • the use of EU subsidies and structural funds; • overcoming fears of most Euro-skeptical environments against the economic discrimination, loss of sovereignty and national identity • preventing withdrawal of the U.S. from Europe in the sense of political security guarantees. Awkwardly, the above mentioned issues can be diffi cult to achieve in the current political conditions within the EU, especially when Poland will pursue a "soft state" policy. Latest policy of the Polish government, based on adaptation to the expectations of the Western countries, resulted in a loss of confi dence in Poland by the countries of the region (mainly Lithuania), which supported Poland in its earlier activities (e.g. the case of Georgia).
There also arises the question of whether the Common Foreign and Security Policy can provide an effective forum for Polish foreign policy 5 . Increase in confl icts of political interests between the EU Member States means that the CFSP is becoming more a political slogan than a reality. Within this reality, each country is trying to push through something of its own, and even if the policy direction is similar (as in the case of France, Spain and Italy with respect to the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean or in the case of Poland and Germany on the Eastern policy), the very interests are usually different. Therefore, even if Poland has received the support of Germany in the Union during the creation of guidelines for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, both countries were guided by different interests. For Germany, co-operation with Russia is the most important issue, both politically and with respect to raw materials. At the same time, Poland is defi nitely more focused on Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia on political issues (targeting those countries to the West) as well as normalization of energy issues in order to become independent from raw materials supplies from Russia.
Despite more intergovernmental than community orientation, Poland supports the measures leading towards the common dimension of the CFSP, as indicated by its involvement in the CSDP (missions and operations). Basic priorities of Poland's security policy in terms of the membership in the EU are: supporting Eastern policy within the EU, supporting the democratization of Ukraine and Belarus, limiting Russian neo-imperialism, active supporting the further deepening of efforts towards creating the common EU energy policy, promotion of the EU's cooperation with Georgia and accession of Turkey into the EU. Poland also perceives the CFSP as a counter power for any imperial efforts of Russia and China in the long term.
It is also worth to ask a question, whether almost ten-years of Poland's membership in the European Union increased the importance of the country in the international arena and strengthened its position. This is a diffi cult question because it would be necessary to simulate what would happen if Poland did not belong to the Union. Certainly, it would be outside the European mainstream. European integration ensures economic growth and belonging to the European "brand", which should theoretically strengthen Poland's role and enhance the image in the international arena. But in the past few years, Poland's role in Central Europe was diminished with the loss of a leader position and some of its reliability 6 in bilateral and multilateral relations (the Visegrad Group, the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus and fi nally Georgia). The role of Poland should be essential in this region and its activities for the integration of Eastern countries regarded as one of the priorities of the security policy. Nowadays, Poland prefers to stay in the "European mainstream" instead of taking care of its own strategic interests. In other words, Polish foreign policy is subordinated to the needs of other EU countries (Germany, France) in order to gain their "respect" and create a "positive" image of a compliant country in the EU.
It can be then concluded that membership in the Union was not a determinant of success as such. Everything depends on the strength of the Polish voice in the EU and its ability to defend own interests. It is not an issue to follow the mainstream if it is not consistent with the national interest. Acting like this (favouring the UE interest above the national ones), the country cannot gain consideration and respect in the international arena either. The attempts to persuade the society that the policy of the strongest EU players is entirely consistent with Poland's raison d'état, which in reality is contradictory to Polish national interest, seem to be the worst thing.
In 2009, P. Bartosiewicz wrote that he had an impression that Poland "was still on the EU periphery" (Bartosiewicz,2009, p. 95) . Regrettably, the situation has not changed 7 . Poland is a country which is not respected in Europe and the European powers do not take into consideration the opinion of the Polish government, except for a few cases, when Poland clearly formulated its position and defended it to reach the goal. Polish international position has not been strengthened in a special way because of the accession to the EU. Instead, our country has certainly lost its leading position in the region and the role of an advocate or even a leader, and sometimes a representative of the interests of Central and Eastern European countries. It also seems that as long as Poland will behave as a "soft" state, it will not strengthen its international position.
It seems that both society and inevitably the government, are mainly focused on the issues: "how do I look?" and "what do they say about me?". This image-politics leads to the disappearance of real policies promoting Polish interests. Nowadays, the means of evaluation of Polish foreign policy has become the assessment by other countries (Żurawski, 2009, p. 341-379) . Typically, criticism comes when Poland begins to act more dynamically in order to defend its own interests. Therefore, "the European mainstream" has no greater ally than the Polish nation in its overwhelming majority. Thus, there arises a question whether subordination of foreign and security policy to the European mainstream and mediocracy in exchange for improvement (?) of the Polish image is a righteous proceeding?
THE ROLE OF NATO IN POLAND'S SECURITY POLICY
Since the adoption of its previous strategy in 1999, the changes in the security environment and threat perception have made it necessary to redefi ne NATO's strategic concept. It was previously focused on broad cooperation with other states for security and maintenance of world peace, but the events on the international scene in the twenty-fi rst century have already left this doctrine far behind, and it has become inadequate in relation to the real needs.
It seemed that the new strategy should defi ne a hierarchy of tasks to be carried out and suggest the prioritization of challenges and threats of a non-military nature. Furthermore, it was supposed to specify the scope and direction of the Alliance's military transformation as well as the reform of its internal structure. A third equally important issue was the question of further enlargement of the organization and its relations with third countries. It was expected that the new strategic concept would defi ne NATO's new non-traditional and multidimensional tasks. This part contains a few comments on the main principles of the new NATO strategic concept as well as Polish priorities with respect to this concept. It closes with an attempt to evaluate the effi ciency of Polish policy in the NATO forum and its implications with respect to the security of the country.
It is worth remembering that Polish government had certain expectations as far as the 2010 Lisbon Summit was concerned with main priorities as follows:
• guaranteeing of an "automatic" application of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as well as clear emphasis on the military character of the Alliance;
• NATO contingency plans which would focus on concrete NATO actions in case of aggression against Poland. In fact, the strategic concept only recalls that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is one of the foundations of the Alliance in its military aspect. In such a situation, it is diffi cult to argue that the concept emerged a new commitment of the Alliance towards Poland and other countries with regard to the nature and understanding of the Article 5, or that its functioning become more automatic. The Article 5, in the same terms, was and remains an important part of the Washington Treaty and the new strategic concept did not apply anything new to the pre-existing arrangements in this respect.
Contingency plans in no way are the result of the new concept. They are the result of many years of efforts of the Polish authorities to cover our country with the plans. Contingency planning has been assumed for many years as one of the two main categories of operational planning of the Alliance, and the same provision applies to all allies and it does not distinguish any country in any way.
Thus, it is worth asking the question if security "quality" in Poland has really changed after the year 2010? If this change is treated as a direct result from the adoption of a new document, this question should be answered negatively. Similarly, it is diffi cult to talk about a revolution, if the reference point are Poland's expectations towards the new document and the results of these expectations. Nevertheless, the Alliance, including Poland, acknowledges new threats and the need to compete against them. The importance of military strength (conventional and nuclear weapons) is noticeable. Evident is the concern about the energy security, the threats coming from new technologies (cyber terrorism), relations with Russia and other partners and the need for developing integrated missile defense. It is emphasized, fi nally, that the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty still exists. But, the question is if all these records are indeed a completely new value, which opens a qualitatively new stage in the transformation of the Alliance? It would be diffi cult to defend such a statement. If, therefore, the "new" NATO after the Lisbon summit, does not create the new value, it does not seem reasonable to say that the adoption of a new strategic concept infl uenced the development or signifi cant progress in Poland's security.
It also worth to analyze priorities of the Polish delegation to the NATO summit in Chicago, which took place on 20-21 May 2012. Poland began to place considerable emphasis on the cooperation within the Weimar Triangle. This shows a considerable change in the direction of the foreign policy. Previously, it was focused on the region of Central Europe with the aim to play the role of its leader. From then on, it was moved toward cooperation with the West. The natural desire to cooperate with the strongest European countries may, however, result in the loss of Poland's importance in the region, while Western countries continue to treat Poland with indulgent condescension on key issues. The weakness of the Polish position in the region is confi rmed by the slowdown in cooperation within the Visegrad Group and the inability to reach a common position with the Baltic States 8 . The whole matter was exacerbated by the lack of coordination between the activities of Polish diplomacy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the President. The role of Poland in NATO has weakened not only as a regional leader, but also as a mediator or a leader on the issue of NATO's cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. Lack of skillful policy in this fi eld also caused a reduction in the rank of Poland within NATO. It is therefore diffi cult to say how Poland is currently building its position within the organization. The attempts to gain international recognition through participation in NATO opera-tions and ad hoc coalitions with the United States were (and still are) very expensive, and the question of their effectiveness is at least debatable (e.g. decisions to withdraw troops from Iraq). In order to succeed, Poland should to combine various tools, and above all, not to squander what was developed many years ago (i.e. leadership in the region, which has been lost by Poland in many spheres recently). Another issue is missile defense, whose form has been substantially changed -the bilateral agreements between the U.S. and Poland were transferred to the NATO forum, so it automatically became a matter of a much lower strategic priority for Poland (the interests of the entire NATO). The lack of ratifi cation of the U.S.-Poland agreement before the end of the Bush presidency caused the situation mentioned above, which resulted in the decision that the fi rst installation in Poland will appear no sooner than in 2018. This in turn is a very clear signal to Russia that the United States take into consideration the opinion of the Kremlin. U.S., and thus the whole NATO moderation in this matter reduces Poland's international position as well as the level of its security. It is in fact a signal for Russia and the whole world that the construction of a missile defense system will be a slow process. Thus, it can be concluded that Poland is ignored in the international arena, and its demands have no power.
The Chicago summit declaration shows the overall condition and mood prevailing among the NATO countries. If the document above all stressed the need to maintain the ability to common defense and crisis response, it can be concluded that there was a fear that NATO in certain situations, may fail in this fi eld. It also emphasizes the need to develop the cooperation with the European Union and partner countries, which means that a lot is expected from the "external" cooperation, therefore, the search for new capacity or new opportunities is in progress. Underlining the need for better use of existing resources merely confi rms the poor fi nancial condition of the organization. Hence, it is worth considering what real security guarantees are behind a historic façade of the NATO's power.
CONCLUSION
Poland is on the periphery of the European Union and is not able to get out. At the same time Poland accepts this situation along with reconciling the policy of agreeing to "tips elder brother". Both politicians and the society need to realize that being a member of an international organization, be it the European Union or NATO, does not create or guarantee security. Geopolitics (which may be neither demonized nor underestimated), however, indicates clearly that Poland is not a powerful country, and despite the current situation in Europe (stability), Polish geographical position remains unchanged. Lack of threats or safety is not a state given once and for all, and historical experience suggests that the international situation is changing very rapidly. Membership in the alliances and international organizations should strengthen safeguards which the state is able to provide to its citizens. Counting only on help of the allies poses a serious threat to the Polish raison d'etat in the case of a serious threat. Poland should also strengthen its role in the region. Resignation of close cooperation in the region is incomprehensible. Poland should seek to build its position in the region and create a local alliance.
Finally, the fact that foreign policy begins to be an instrument of elections is also problematic in Polish politics. It became either an ad hoc tool for creating the image for the internal needs or a tool for establishing at all costs the party's image as a defender of Polish national interests, regardless of whether it really serves the national interest or not. Unfortunately, deep political divisions as well as ideological and competence disputes adversely affect in a signifi cant manner both: Polish position and its image in the world.
